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LAW AND QUANTITATIVE MULTIVARIATE
ANALYSIS: AN ENCOUNTERf
Arnold H. Lozowick,* Peter 0. Steiner,** and Roger Miller***
I.

W

INTRODUCTION

are the lawyer's stock in tirade. He would rather face a
page of fine print than a single algebraic formula. A trial
is the collection of oral testimony, a contract aims at expressing a
legal undertaking verbally, and that final and highest product of
the legal profession, the law review article, is an uninterrupted
stream of words.
Words, however, are only one way of finding facts, expressing
relationships, or formulating arguments. Numbers may do so as
well. For several centuries, scientific disciplines have relied heavily
on numerical, or quantitative, approaches to the discovery of truth.
In recent decades the social scientists have turned increasingly toward numerical analysis as an essential tool of their trade. The
learned journals of the economic profession, for example, often
seem to regard words as secondary; the substance of the thought of
the contemporary economist emerges in a series of statistical formulae, tables, and other incantations. The same is increasingly true
of the political scientist, the sociologist, and the psychologist.
The social scientist has turned to statistical techniques because
they permit the investigation of social, economic, and other human
relationships not subject to laboratory control with the intellectual
rigor and empirical standards of proof hitherto characteristic only
of laboratory sciences. One of these techniques, and the subject of
this Article, is quantitative multivariate analysis.
The Article attempts to explain the basic approach of quantitative multivariate analysis and to show how it can be applied to
the solution of legal problems. We will demonstrate that this techORDS
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nique can grapple with complex factual questions arising in a legal
context, and that it can do so in a controlled manner, rather than
by the accumulation of a mountain of unrelated facts which can be
utilized only by a leap of intuition. This is the key to our argument:
It is possible to use numbers and numerical analysis in an ordered
search for the truth. In this role numbers serve not merely as the
illustrations of a legal argument, but act as important conditions
and constraints upon that argument. In deference to the tradition
we challenge, this Article consists of many words and few numbers;
but the latter are as important as the former.
For many lawyers the word "statistics" evokes a sterile numbers
game such as that which characterizes recent Supreme Court antitrust opinions. Many lawyers are disturbed by what they regard as
the libertine manner in which the Court selects the statistics it will
use and by its arbitrary determination of the numbers which establish the defendant's guilt. With a full awareness of the quagmire we
are entering, we will attempt to show that quantitative analysis can
assist in the rational solution of a central question of antitrust law:
the selection of the relevant market in a merger case. If we are correct in the hypothesis that quantitative analysis can penetrate this
morass, it deserves the attention of the legal profession.
This Article chronicles one attempt to blend the sophisticated
science of statistics with the mysterious art of the law in an antitrust case. Once again, we hope to provide lawyers with an understanding of a tool which can be used in resolving complex factual
questions wherever they arise, not merely in an antitrust context.
Although the lawyer will not emerge from this encounter as an accomplished statistician or economist, he may be able to talk to his
fellow social scientists and to achieve a more fruitful application
of social science techniques to the law.

II.

THE CONTINENTAL BANK MERGER CASE

On September I, 1961, the Continental Illinois National Bank
and Trust Company of Chicago, the second largest bank in Chicago,
merged with the City National Bank and Trust Company, the sixth
largest. The surviving bank, Continental, thus became the largest
in Chicago. This merger was caught in the first flurry of government actions brought against bank mergers under the antitrust laws
-the burst of activity which led to the Supreme Court's Philadelphia Bank and Bank of Lexington decisions1 and to the ManufacI. United States v. Philadelphia National Bame, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); United States
v. First National Bank and Trust Co., 376 U.S. 686 (1964).
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turers Hanover decision in the Southern District of New York.2
The Government based its complaint in the Continental Bank case
on the same statistical approach it employed in those cases-an
approach which is either simple or simplistic, depending upon one's
point of view.
The gist of the Government's case was its contention that Continental would have an excessive share of the Chicago banking market. This argument was buttressed by an assertion that the concentration of the four largest banks in Chicago was also too high. The
complaint alleged that the merged bank's market share would represent 26 per cent of the total deposits of all banks in the city of
Chicago and 34 per cent of the total deposits of all banks in the
Chicago central business district. It put the corresponding fourbank concentration ratios at 64 per cent and 90 per cent respectively. Especially after the Philadelphia Bank case, it was obvious
that these figures were in the danger zone and that, if the Government could support them, the merger would be in real trouble.3
There was no doubt about the arithmetical accuracy of the Government's figures. They were based on the balance sheets showing
total deposits and loans which the Chicago banks were required to
file with bank regulatory agencies. It was possible to show that the
Government's selection of the relevant geographic market was somewhat narrow. But so long as the same basis of computation was
used, an expansion of the market to include the entire metropolitan
area would only have reduced the merged bank's market share to
a point between 19 per cent and 22 per cent-figures still well
within the danger zone.
This Article will demonstrate how the authors proposed to reduce Continental's market share for a critical segment of banking
-loans to businesses-from 27.1 per cent to 9.4 per cent; the fourbank concentration ratio was similarly reduced from 84.7 per cent
to 31.6 per cent. These reductions, combined with a similar examination of other segments of the banking business and a historical
trend of deconcentration due largely to the successful entry of new
banks into the Chicago market, placed the Continental Bank case
in a category by itself-one which we believed would impress even
the United States Supreme Court. Since the Bank Merger Act of
2. United States v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 240 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y.
1965).
3. Before the Philadelphia Bank case, Continental's lawyers were less concerned with
the numbers. They had patiently explained to the economists why the case did not fall
under § 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964), but instead under § 1 of the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (19(i4).
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19664 gave its retroactive blessing to the Continental Bank merger,
no court passed on our presentation. 11 Although the saga of a successful struggle to defend an antimerger action under section 7 of
the Clayton Act must await another day, the defense prepared in
the Continental Bank case does provide us with a case study in
quantitative multivariate analysis.
Ill.

FORMULATING THE PROBLEM

The lawyers for Continental began to prepare their case in traditional fashion: they sat down with their client to be educated
in the banking business. Even before the Philadelphia Bank case, it
was no secret that concentration ratios in an appropriately defined
market would be important. What emerged from these discussions
was familiar to every banker and to anyone who has worked through
the district court's opinion in the Manufacturers Hanover case. Even
if one accepts the Supreme Court's determination in the Philadelphia Bank case that the appropriate "line of commerce" in a bank
merger case is commercial banking, this does no more than eliminate nonbanking financial institutions as relevant competitors. There
remains the problem of defining the relevant market and developing measures of concentration therein. The principle measures of
market structure in the banking industry are bank deposits and
loans, which are two types of banking services. These bank services,
however, are not rendered in unitary markets but in a multimarket
context. Bankers recognize this fact when they speak of "wholesale"
and "retail" banking.
"Wholesale" banking, to the banking profession, means the deposit, loan, and related services rendered by banks to large business
enterprises whose resources are great, whose needs are large, and
whose business activities are usually regional or national in scope.
In general, the banks that provide "wholesale" banking services
are large ones; competition among large banks for the business of
large customers tends to cross local and regional lines. In short,
bankers believe that the market for "wholesale" banking services
is nationwide.
In "retail" banking, on the other hand, the typical customers
are individuals and small businesses. Such customers use banks for
personal checking accounts, savings deposits, real estate or auto4. 12 U.S.C. § 1828 (Supp. II, 1965-1966).
5. On March 11, 1966, the Continental Bank case was dismissed pursuant to § 2(a)
of the Bank Merger Act of 1966, 80 Stat. 10: "Any merger •.• which was consumated
prior to June 17, 1963 •.. shall be conclusively presumed to have not been in violation of any antitrust laws other than [section 2 of the Sherman Act]."
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mobile loans, and small business loans. These small customers cannot
go very far to obtain banking services; hence only local banks can
effectively compete with one another in providing such services. In
other words, the relevant market for "retail" banking services is less
than nationwide.
In the Continental Bank case, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice chose to attack the merger only in the local
market, recognizing that the merged bank's share of the national
market was insignificant. However, if the bankers' distinction was
a valid one, there were good reasons to suppose that Continental's
share of the local retail market was in fact much smaller than that
shown by the Government's undiscriminating statistics. Large banks
have a relatively larger share of the wholesale business than do small
banks; small banks have a relatively larger share of the retail business. Therefore, statistics which combine wholesale and retail transactions would overstate a large bank's share of the retail business.
Furthermore, Continental's share of the retail market in Chicago
was probably smaller than that of banks of equivalent size elsewhere
in the country because Illinois law prohibits branch banking. 6 Continental' s inability to establish branches in suburban and neighborhood business areas presumably handicapped its retail business.
Unfortunately, although bankers are convinced that the distinction is valid, their balance sheet data do not distinguish between
"wholesale" and "retail" activities; and it was on these balance
sheets that the Government had built its case. Even if the markets
were fundamentally different, that business fact was useless to the
lawyers unless they could separate the markets in the data. Solid
criteria were needed to give substance to the distinction. And while
the bankers were certain that the markets really were different, they
could make neither confident nor precise st~tements about the characteristics which distinguished them.
In the Manufacturers Hanover case, decided well after our project was underway, Judge MacMahon recognized the relevance of
the retail-wholesale distinction and proposed a single criterion of
differentiation for business loans. On the basis of the evidence presented, he concluded that the crucial factor in determining the nature of a given loan transaction was the size of the loan. He then
found that all business loans of more than $100,000 were made in
the national, "wholesale" market, and all smaller loans in the local,
"retail" market. 7
6. ILL. R.Ev. STAT. ch. 16½, § 106 (1963).
7. 240 F. Supp. 867 at 921.
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This simple standard, if accepted, would have provided Continental with an even smaller share of the local market than that
which resulted from our analysis. 8 But this standard rested on no
firmer a foundation than the strength of Judge MacMahon's intuition. Although his intuition turned out to be good in one case,
it could not be relied upon to convince another court. It had no
systematic statistical support of any kind; in an adversary proceeding, even a plausible intuitive standard is always vulnerable.

IV. THE ECONOMISTS REFORMULATE THE PROBLEM
At this point Continental's lawyers sought out an academic economist. To their naive dismay he had no magic formula to describe
the relevant market and no thermometer to measure the intensity
of competition in that market. The economist was unembarrassed,
however, since it is obvious that in these respects his profession
does not lag behind Congress, the courts, or the Antitrust Division.
Still, the trip to academe was not wasted. The economist agreed
that market shares are important in antitrust cases when they can
be used as proxies for an inherently immeasurable concept-the
intensity of competition. 9 But this will be so only if the "market"
is a meaningful one. This requires the identification of the groups
of sellers and buyers of a given product whose relations are sufficiently intertwined to give rise to a market in the product. Although no such identification of sellers and buyers would be airtight,
not all approximations are equally satisfactory. Although a market
is ultimately defined geographically, its definition is not a matter
of mere geography. It is a question of fact: which buyers and sellers
have access to one another. 10
8. See note 45 infra.
9. The economist offered the following theoretical formulation of the problem,
amplifying the intuitive approach of the lawyers and bankers. Any "market share"
(the fraction of the customers in a market accruing to a particular seller) or "concentration ratio" (the aggregate market shares of the group of largest sellers) is in
the first instance merely an arithmetical concept that might or might not be significant in an antitrust case, depending on the substantive standards used in its construction.
With respect to the sales (or purchases) of a given product or service, the general
definition of the market share of firm A is
market share of
sales of firm A of given product to customer group X

=

firm A
all purchases by customer group X of given product
It is clear that the market share of a firm can vary enormously as the definition of
"given product" and of "customer group X" is changed. To take some extreme examples. Continental Bank's share of business loans to all American borrowers is very
low; its share of loans to businesses who are its depositors is very high; its share of
"bank savings deposits" is higher than its share of "bank and savings and loan deposits." And so on.
10. For a discussion of the theoretical issues involved in market definition, see
Steiner, l,farkets and Industries in 9 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCI•
ENCES 575 (1968).
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At this point the economist proposed an interesting experiment.
Assuming that the bankers' distinction between "wholesale" and
"retail" banking was a plausible hypothesis, and accepting the lawyers' view that the retail market was the legally relevant market, the
economist suggested using observed data about banks and their customers to distinguish between "retail" and "wholesale" customers.
Such a distinction, if tenable, could then be applied to Chicago
banks and customers, and separate market shares and concentration
ratios could be computed for retail banking business. These figures
would presumably be better indicators of the effect of the merger
on the intensity of competition in the retail market than the Government's balance sheet statistics, which mixed wholesale and retail
as well as local and nonlocal customers.
The "experiment" was conducted and is described in detail below. It is worth spelling out our working hypotheses at the start:
I. The retail customer described by the bankers would find it
difficult to bank outside of his own locality. He would be, in that
sense, "locally limited." If we observed such customers, we would
find them banking locally.
2. The wholesale customer would be able to bank either inside
or outside of his own locality. Other things being equal, he might
find it more convenient to bank locally; but other things would not
always be equal. He would be what we call a "non-locally limited"
customer. If we observed such customers, we would find some banking locally and others banking far from their own locality.
3. We might therefore sensibly begin our effort to distinguish
between the retail and the wholesale customer by looking at those
customers who banked locally and those who did not. The former
group would include all of the retail customers and some of the
wholesale ones; the latter group would be limited to the remaining
wholesale customers.
4. We hypothesized that the ability of a customer to conduct
his banking business outside his locality would correlate with measurable characteristics of his business, of the bank, and of the transaction.
In fact, our analysis was to concentrate on business loans-a
most important segment of the banking business. The first stage
would be to identify, if we could, those constellations of characteristics which account for differences between local loans and nonlocal loans. Identifying such characteristics would be only the first
step, since the local-loan category includes some wholesale as well
as all retail customers. But by isolating the differences between re-
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tail customers and those wholesale customers banking nonlocally,
we hoped also to provide the basis for the second stage of the analysis: to distinguish generally between retail (locally limited) and
wholesale (non-locally limited) customers. 11
V.

THE SEARCH FOR DATA

The anaysis proposed by the economists (by this time there were
two of them--economists, like lawyers, are prone to run in packs)
required a substantial quantity of data. We needed information
about the locations of bank and borrower and various other characteristics of the bank, of the borrower, and of the loan transaction.
We also required a source of information that covered a very large
and representative group of transactions.
The importance of a large body of data as the basis of the experiment requires some emphasis. In the physical sciences an experiment often consists of a limited number of rigorously controlled
laboratory tests. In chemistry, a specific chemical is added to a specific mixture of chemicals and other factors, such as temperature,
are held constant. The chemist then notes a specific reaction. Having
controlled the factors involved, he has no need to repeat the experiment many times, although some repetition is always desirable
to offset errors in measurement. The chemist knows that the added
chemical caused the reaction because all other things were unchanged. On the other hand, the social scientist is forced to collect
his experimental data from the real world; in our case data describing the normal working of banking markets was required. Such
data would necessarily be the product of an uncontrolled experiment-other things can and do change from case to case. For this
reason the range of factors that might have produced a given result was very large indeed. The social scientist who wants to know
whether there is a "real" (or significant) relationship between factor A and result B must observe a very large number of cases in
which factor A is present and a very large number of cases in which
11. In order to make this distinction clear, consider three bank customers: a small
manufacturing company ("Tiny Manufacturing Co.'), Sears, Roebuck &: Company,
and General Motors. From the point of view of a Chicago bank, these customers would
be classified as follows:
Customer location
Customer banking
relative to
Location of
alternatives
Chicago Bank
principal office
Tiny Manufacturing Co.
Sears, Roebuck &: Co.
General Motors

Chicago
Chicago
Detroit

local
local
nonlocal

locally limited
not locally limited
not locally limited
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it is not present and see whether there is a systematic relationship
between factor A's presence or absence and result B, even though
other things are also changing. In fact, at present there are wellestablished statistical procedures for identifying a significant relationship if one exists, provided enough cases are examined.
Because the range of factors which might explain any given result in the real world is so broad, a large number of independent
observations is required to determine whether a particular factor
is influencing a given result. A pattern of correlation takes on increasing significance if it is encountered over and over again despite the fact that other factors are varying in an uncontrolled way.
Thus, the fact that a man is shorter than his wife does not establish
that men are shorter than women or that short men choose tall
wives. However, if a representative sample of ten thousand men
and women shows that the men are, on the average, several inches
taller than women, we are justified in concluding that this pattern
is a significant one and that men do indeed tower over women.
(The matrimonial question would require a different set of data.)
Ideally, a lawyer trying to impress a court might have wished
to study all loans made in the country. Since this was impossibleas well as unnecessary from the statistical point of view-we settled for a sample of transactions. In order for the results obtained
from any such sample to permit valid inferences applicable to the
population of loans we were ultimately interested in, our sample
would have to be representative of the population. For such purposes a random sample is, paradoxically, ideal. The probability that
a random sample will be representative can be predicted with statistical precision, and the probability that sample results closely
match those which would be obtained if the entire universe were
studied increases as the sample size increases. 12
With unlimited time and money we could, of course, have set
out to collect such data ourselves. But it is always convenient and
often possible to use someone else's statistics which have usually
been collected for some other purpose. Clients' records, government agencies, private organizations, and universities are all prime
data sources. Fortunately, we discovered that in 1955 the Federal
Reserve Board had conducted a sweeping survey of the business
lending activities of a sample of almost 2,000 of its 6,000 member
banks. This survey of over 180,000 separate loan transactions se12. It is beyond the scope of this Article to describe the intricacies of survey
design and sampling techniques. But these are well-established and thoroughly accepted by statisticians.
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lected on a statistical sampling basis accurately reflected the characteristics of more than 1,185,000 business loans totalling more than
$30 billion. In addition to the location of both borrower and bank,
the Federal Reserve study contained information about a variety of
characteristics of bank, customer, and loan-many of which seemed
likely to be relevant to our inquiry.13
13. The consent of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System was
necessary before we were able to obtain the data from the 1955 survey. To obtain
this consent, we made contact with the key economists at the Research Department
of the Federal Reserve Board to discuss the possibility of using the 1955 business loan
survey data. It was relatively easy to convince these economists that our proposal was
based on a carefully conceived, feasible research program which would yield results
of general interest to the Board and the banking and academic communities. This was
helped by a preliminary analysis of the work already done by the Federal Reserve
Board, which showed some significant correlations and suggested the need for further
work along the lines we proposed.
There was, however, one stumbling block which is likely to arise in many attempts
to use data sources developed by other organizations for their own use. The 1955
business loan survey, though already coded in machine-readable form, contained detailed information permitting the identification of individual banks as well as bank
customers. For the Federal Reserve Board to reveal such information would have
violated the confidential basis on which it was collected from the banks. Our ability
to use the data depended upon our ability to use the data without requiring such
disclosure.
Since this problem is likely to arise often, a few words about our solution of it are
in order. One expedient involved the suppression of data that identified the lending
bank. Instead of identifying each bank by a code number and by its location and size,
as the original data did, we reclassified the data to have a new bank identification
number assigned that referred to three (or more) banks of the same general size in
the same location. In a few cases it was necessary to have banks from different local·
ities in the same group. Where this was necessary, an attempt was made to choose
similar localities to group together. Each loan transaction was kept separate in other
respects; a computer print-out would show only that one of these banks had made a
certain loan, but not which one. The use of small groups to avoid disclosure without
at the same time losing all of the information about individual entitites has been used
in other connections-for example, in analyzing confidential data reported by tele•
vision broadcasting stations to the Federal Communications Commission. If there is
to be no identification it is necessary that each group contain a minimum of three reporting entities; in this way even one of the three grouped banks cannot identify the
data for one of the other banks with which it is grouped.
A second expedient was to replace precisely coded values of variables by quantita•
tive intervals. For example, all borrowers with total assets of $1,000,000 to $5,000,000
would be coded as of the same size class.
Care must be taken in reclassifying data for the purpose of avoiding disclosure not
to throw away information that might be important. When a group of banks (as in
this case) is created, any differences among the banks in any one group disappear and
cannot be focused upon for their explanatory value in the analysis that follows. Thus,
any potentially relevant variables must be preserved, particularly in an adversary
proceeding. Our grouping of banks assumed that bank size and bank location were
relevant. If on the other hand we had supposed that the age of bank was important,
a different set of groupings would have been in order. Although it ultimately developed that bank size was not an important variable for our purposes, we could not
have assumed this nor would we have been unchallenged had we assumed it.
By grouping banks and adjusting class intervals it was possible to assure the Federal Reserve Board that we had a reclassification scheme in which no bank or borrower would be identified in any individual transaction. With this assurance the
Federal Reserve Board gave permission to utilize the data. A computer program was
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No secondhand data are ever wholly satisfactory, and this set
was no exception. Five principal deficiencies became apparent:
I. The data were for 1955, six years before the merger date.
This was potentially a serious weakness, but the basic patterns of
bank and customer behavior we were looking for would not be
likely to change rapidly.14 Research disclosed that the 1955 survey
was the only suitable source of data for our purposes. 15
2. The data, although a random sample of loans of banks in the
Federal Reserve System, did not sample the 50 per cent of the nation's banks which are not members of the Federal Reserve System.
Comparable data for nonmember banks was not generally available,
although (fortunately) we were able to find such data for the Chicago metropolitan area in the final stages of the study.16
3. The data referred only to business loans. This meant that
we would have to focus on the business-lending aspect of the banking business, but that was, after all, a most important aspect. In
the Philadelphia Bank case the Antitrust Division relied heavily on
testimony about the supposed plight of the small businessman, and
the Supreme Court reflected this concern in its opinion.17
4. The data did not consider business loans of nonbank financial institutions. The economists urged that we supplement these
data in order to consider the effect of competition from nonbank
financial institutions in defining markets and computing market
shares. Plainly, the addition of nonbank competitors might dramatically reduce concentration in the market. 18 After the decision
in the Philadelphia Bank case, however, it seemed equally plain to
the lawyers that the appropriate "line of commerce" in bank merger
cases under section 7 of the Clayton Act was commercial banking. 19
developed which took the original data, reclassified it, and produced a new computer
tape containing the essential information about each of the 180,000 loan transactions
in the 1955 Loan Survey. This tape can not be used to discover confidential information about individual banks or borrowers.
14. Our efforts to update the 1955 data to 1961 are briefly described in note 46
infra.
15. The Federal Reserve Board had conducted a similar wide-ranging study of
business loans in 1957. However, this study omitted the critical variable of borrower
location and it was therefore of no value to us.
16. See note 42 infra.
17, 374 U.S. at 369.
18. Refer to the equation contained in note 9 supra. Nonbank custom would increase the denominator of the ratio without changing the numerator. It would thus
necessarily reduce the market shares of banks. By way of contrast, our proposal was
to compute concentration ratios based on the elimination of "wholesale" business.
This would affect both the denominator and numerator of the ratio and need not
necessarily reduce concentration.
19. This question has perhaps been reopened by the Bank Merger Act of 1966,
80 Stat. 7.
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The lawyers therefore rejected this academic advice, at least for the
purposes of this litigation.
5. The basis of sampling was the individual loan, not the individual borrower. This seemingly minor point became very important at a later stage in our analysis.20
Had this body of data not been available, our subsequent research would have been different but we should still have been able
to splice together other smaller bodies of data and make some progress toward defining the relevant market.
VI.

IDENTIFICATION OF THE SIGNIFICANT VARIABLES

With the data available we set about our research for an explanation of the differences between local and nonlocal loans. In
quantitative analysis the search for objective explanations begins
with the identification of systematically related variables. If two variables tend to be systematically related, as are the height and weight
of individuals, they are said to be "correlated." The degree of correlation may vary from very low to very high. At one extreme, "zero
correlation" means that there is no systematic tendency for a relationship between the variables. At the other extreme, "perfect correlation" implies that all of the variation in one variable can be
accounted for by variation in the other. 21
Our first objective was to determine whether we could account
for a substantial part of the difference between local and nonlocal
loans on the basis of systematic correlation with other measurable
variables. The 1955 business loan survey made this possible because
every loan covered by the survey was identifiable as either a local
or a nonlocal loan; it was clear if the borrower and the bank were
located in the same place or in two different places.22 The survey
also contained information about some twenty-five additional char20. See pages 1666-68 infra.
21. See note 26 infra.
22. In the 1955 survey a loan was considered local if the borrower's address was
in the same city, county or metropolitan area (whichever was the largest) as that of
the bank. For example, a loan made by a bank in Chicago to a customer located
anywhere in the Chicago metropolitan area, including the suburbs, was treated as a
local loan. ·we established, as a separate exercise in quantitative analysis, that this
area was indeed the proper local "retail" market area by an analysis of the geographic
distribution of the retail business of the Continental and City National Banks, and
also by special surveys of seven other smaller banks in the area, selected in a random
manner. The analysis showed that the area served by a bank did not always cover the
entire metropolitan area, but the coverage increased as the size of the bank increased.
There was so much overlapping of areas served, however, that it was clear that only
the metropolitan area as a whole was a satisfactory market definition, rather than some
smaller area, as the government contended.
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acteristics of each such loan transaction. 28 On the basis of our conversations with bankers, the testimony in previous cases, economic
theory, and common sense, we expected to find that some of these
characteristics, such as loan size, borrower size, and bank size, would
help account for the difference between local and nonlocal loans.
Well-established statistical techniques permit the determination
of whether and to what extent each of a series of "independent variables"-in our case factors such as loan size, borrower size, and bank
size-helps account for the variation in the "dependent variable"in our case whether the loan was local or nonlocal. The phrase "significantly correlated" means that a systematic relationship is strong
enough to make it highly improbable that it reflects mere chance.
One way to suggest the approach is to look at a simple one-way
tabulation of the data. Table I shows the relation between size of
loan and the location characteristic.24 This table summarizes information covering all of the loans in the 1955 survey, over 180,000
sampled transactions representative of over one million loans. Table
I clearly shows that, ignoring all other factors, the percentage of
loans made locally decreases as the size of loan increases. Although
any particular loan might be local or nonlocal for a large number
of reasons, the pattern which emerges from this table suggests that
one of the important reasons has something to do with the loan size.
A similar finding emerged for borrower size, as shown in table 2.
Ignoring all other factors, the tendency to borrow nonlocally increases as the size of the borrower increases.
On the other hand, not all of the factors we had chosen exhibited such a clear relationship. As table 3 shows, for example,
increasing bank size is not associated with any clear pattern in the
location characteristic of the loans.
From these three tables we are not entitled to conclude that
23. A partial listing of these characteristics is as follows:
Bank characteristics: Federal Reserve district, state, city of the lending bank; (from
these we also can derive branching status, and city size); size of bank (total deposits);
loan ratio.
Borrower characteristics: Legal form of organization, date of organization, business
of borrower; city location of borrower; location relative to lending bank; size of borrower (total assets).
Loan characteristics: Original amount of loan; amount outstanding; original maturity of loan; bank participation; call class of loan; repayment method; type of collateral; effective interest rate; date loan made; federal government participation or
guarantee.
24. In our analysis we actually looked both at number of loans and dollar balance
of loans. In this exposition we will limit attention to number of loans. This is partly
a matter of convenience, but more basically since the loan survey was a sample of
loans, it is each loan that is an independent observation, not each dollar. In general,
the result5 were similar whether number of loans or dollar amount was used.
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TABLE I
Loan Size and Loan Location
Percentage of Loans
Made Locally

Loan Sizea
Under $10,000
$10,000-25,000
$25,000-50,000
$50,000-100,000
$100,000-200,000
$200,000-500,000
$500,000-1 million
SI million-5 million
$5 million-IO million
$10 million and over
All Loan Sizes

90.3%
88.5
85.9
81.5
75.5
63.7
57.5
46.1
37.5
38.9
88.7

a. Here and elsewhere, lower limit inclusive.

TABLE 2
Borrower Size and Loan Location
Percentage of Loans
Made Locally

Borrower Size
(Total assets)
Under $50,000
$50,000-250,000
$250,000-1 million
$1 million-5 million
$5 million-25 million
$25 million-100 million
$100 million and over
All Borrower Sizes

90.5%

91.2
86.6
75.0
56.1
38.0
33.8
88.7

TABLE 3
Bank Size and Loan Location
Bank Size
(Total deposits)
Under $50 million
$50 million-200 million
$200 million-400 million
$400 million-1.5 billion
$1.5 billion and over
All Bank Sizes

Percentage of Loans
Made Locally
91.0%
85.0
86.0
82.0
91.0
88.7

loan size and borrower size are important but that bank size is not.
It does not suffice to examine separately each of a series of possible
independent variables in relation to the dependent variable, location of the loan transaction. It is entirely possible that two separate
characteristics, each of which appears to relate systematically to differences in the location characteristic, are really measuring the same
thing. Everyone knows that borrowers of large amounts tend to be
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larger firms; indeed, a large loan creates a large asset. The apparent
relationships in tables 1 and 2 may really be due to only one of
these characteristics; there is no way to tell which from those tables.
One way to sort out these relationships is to cross-classify by both
variables, as is done in table 4. In this table every row examines the
variation according to borrower size for a given size of loan. A row
partakes of the "controlled experiment" in which we examine the
effect upon the location characteristic of variation in customer size
holding loan size constant. Each column holds customer size constant and looks at the effect of loan size. Since each row of table 4
shows a systematic relation between customer size and the location
characteristic, we can conclude that customer size plays a role independent of loan size. And, since each column shows a systematic
relation between loan size and the location characteristic, we conclude that loan size also plays a role independent of customer size.
We have made progress, but we are not ready to conclude that
both loan size and customer size are important explanatory variables. The reason is that table 4 ignored a variety of other variables.
For example, in that table we included all loans--some were single
bank loans, some pool loans, some secured, some unsecured, some
at higher interest rate than others, and so forth. Perhaps the apparent pattern of table 4 is due to differences in these respects; the
apparent relationship between loan and customer size may be a
spurious one reflecting other "real differences" that just happen to
be correlated with loan and customer size. Apparent relationships
often disappear when considered with other factors.
These first tentative steps into the mystery of quantitative multivariate analysis have taken us to the very heart of the experimental
process we are describing. Since it is impossible to control variables
in a social or economic context as a physical scientist does in a
physics or chemistry experiment, it is necessary to introduce such
controls by studying a large number of actual events in all of their
complexity. This would be impossible without the techniques of
modern statistics and the mechanical assistance of the computer.
With the computer, it is simply a matter of gathering the data,
designing the computer program to process the data, and feeding
it all into the computer. Out pops the result: an acre of tables or
mathematical formulae. (Patience: you are paying your experts to
teach you how to reduce the tables to reasoned verbal arguments.)
In principle, the computer is used to classify the basic information so that the interrelationships between the various indepen-
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TABLE 4
Loan Size, Borrower Size, and Loan Location
(Percentage of Loans Made Locally)
Borrower Size (Total Assets)
Loan Size
Under $10,000
$10,000-25,000
$25,000-50,000
$50,000-100,000
$100,000-200,000
$200,000-500,000
$500,000-1 million
$1 million-5 million
$5 million-IO million
$10 million and over
All loan sizes

$250,0001 million

Under
$50,000

$50,000250,000

90.6%
89.3
83.6
91.0
79.8
50.3
25.0

91.6%
90.7
89.7
87.7
89.2
81.3
57.5
59.3

86.3%
87.2
88.0
86.5
84.5
81.2
74.5
43.4

91.2

86.6
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$1 million5 million
82.7%
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76.4
75.9
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75.0
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59.4
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52.9
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40.9
56.1

$25 million100 million
74.4%
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41.l
27.0
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35.7
40.l
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29.6
38.0
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and over
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sizes•~

48.5%
41.2
43.5
24.5
29.1
26.0
29.0
33.5
35.0
45.6
33.8
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88.5
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81.5
75.5
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57.5
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88.7
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dent variables and the dependent variables are fully revealed. There
are two basic ways to do this. One way is the cross-classification: a
table or a series of tables in which each variable under study is
introduced and related to each other variable. Table 4 is an example of a two-way cross-classification. In preparing a cross-classification, the computer pigeonholes each transaction in an appropriate
"cell" described by the particular values of each of the variables
under consideration. It then prints out each cell in a prespecified
pattern, adding up and perhaps performing calculations upon the
observations in each cell. Thus, in table 4, the upper left hand cell
represents loans of under $10,000 to borrowers with assets of less
than $50,000. The computer has stuffed the cell with all such loans
and then computed the percentage of such loans which were made
to local customers. The result is 90.6 per cent.
The only technological limit to cross-classification is the memory
capacity of the computer. There is, however, a limit to the process,
even for the expert, because the addition of every new variable multiplies the number of cells by the number of possible values of the
new variable. A simple example will make this clear. Suppose we
visualize nine categories of loan size, nine of customer size, five of
bank size, and ten categories of type of loan. There are 81 (9 X 9)
distinct combinations of loan size and customer size. Each of these
eighty-one cells can contain loans by each of five bank sizes; thus
there are 405 distinct loan-customer-bank size classes. But each of
these cells can contain ten different types of loan. To distinguish
among them while still maintaining all of the previous distinctions
requires 4,050 distinct cells. It would take a very large body of experimental data to "fill" a cross-classification with 4,050 cells to
such an extent that significant patterns would be apparent. The
great virtue of the Federal Reserve Board's 1955 business loan survey was in its 180,000 sampled transactions which represented over
one million loans; the large number of observations permitted extensive cross-classification. In this respect, our most serious restraint
was the inability of the mind to interpret what spewed out of the
computer. Our largest cross-classification contained over 200 pages
of computer printout; each page contained ninety-nine cells; six
independent variables were cross-classified.
The 1955 business loan survey contained over twenty-five variables of potential interest to us. No single cross-classification could
realistically examine this number of variables. 25 Fortunately, the
25. Consider the approximate number of cells. Suppose each variable had only 5
values. This means 525 cells-an astronomical number of the order of a billion billion.
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social scientist, aided and abetted by the mathematical stat1st1c1an,
has other tools for dealing with problems of this complexity. The
most important is regression analysis, which examines simultaneously a large number of independent variables using computerassisted mathematical techniques. Given a properly constituted body
of observations, regression analysis can give estimates of the effect
of changes in each independent variable on changes in the dependent variable, holding all other independent variables constant. It
can also reveal the likelihood that these observed relationships in
the data are the result of chance or reflect actual relationships in the
universe from which the data was collected. Furthermore, regression
analysis will show how much of the variation in the dependent variable is accounted for by variations in the independent variables
studied or, conversely, how much of the variation in the dependent
variable is the result of chance, measurement errors, or the influence of other variables not included in the analysis. Here we enter
an area which borders on the occult.26 Suffice it to say that, in the
Even our enormous sample of 180,000 loans would appear as flecks of dust in a mountain of zeros in any cross-classification containing so many cells.
26. We cannot give the uninitiated a short course in statistics here. But we can at
least illuminate the vocabulary by a somewhat oversimplified illustration. The following are the hypothetical results of a regression analysis in which an attempt was
made to relate variation in a dependent variable {Y) to three independent variables
<X1, X:J, Xs):
Hypothesized Relationship:
Relationship to be estimated:
Computed Relationship:
Coefficient of Determination:

Y=a1 X1 +¾ X2 +a3 X 3 +e
Y'=a1 X 1 +a 2 X 2 +a3 X 3
y, = .20)S_ + .04X2 -.13X3
~=-61

Significance of Regression Coefficients

Coefficient

Standard
error

¾

.05

a2

.002

aa

.09

t ratio

.20
- - = 4.0
.05
.04
-=20.0
.002
.13
- - = 1.4
.09

Significantly
different from
zero at 5% level
yes
yes
no

The measures a 1 , a 2 and a 3 are called regression coefficients; they are estimates of
al' ¾ and a 3• Each regression coefficient tells how much the dependent variable {Y)
changes on average for each unit change in the particular independent variable,
holding the other independent variables constant. For example, the fact that a1 =
+.20 means that for a IO unit increase in the value of Xl' it is predicted that Y will
increase by 2 units on the average, assuming no change in X2 or X3 •
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Continental Bank case, the consulting economists used regression
analysis to examine a large number of variables and to eliminate
a number of variables which were found to be unimportant.27
In the Continental Bank case we deliberately chose cross-classification instead of regression as the primary technique of multivariate analysis for two reasons. First, the lawyers were convinced
that a courtroom presentation based on a regression analysis would
strain the limits of judicial tolerance. Second, in some areas, crossclassifications were more revealing of significant relationships than
was regression analysis. 28 But cross-classification was used only on the
variables that regression analysis suggested might prove significant.
The absolute size of the regression coefficients is not necessarily an indication of
their importance, for two reasons. The first is that the importance of a coefficient
depends on the units in which the X's and Y are measured as well as the range of
their variation. For example, using the hypothetical formula given above, suppose
that X 1 can vary only from O to 2, that X 2 can vary from 100 to 1000, and that Y is
normally a number with a value like 50. The predicted variation in Y resulting from
the maximum variation in X 1 would be .4 (2 X .2 .4). This is a relatively unimportant variation where Y is normally in the range of 50. On the other hand, a maximum variation in X., would be 900 and the predicted effect on Y from such a
variation would be ll6 (900 X .04 ll6). This is a relatively important variation.
The second reason that the absolute size of the regression coefficient does not indicate their importance is that these figures are averages. Their reliability depends on
how much variation there is around the average, looking at the individual cases. The
standard error of the regression coefficient gives a measure of that variability. Roughly
two-thirds of the individual observations will lie within ± one standard error of the
mean of a normally distributed variable and 95% will lie within ± two standard
errors. For example, the value of a 1 (.20) is more than twice its standard error (.05).
Hence there is less than a 5% chance that the true value of the coefficient (X1) is
equal to zero, and the value of a1 is the result of sampling variation. Using this widely
accepted 5% test in our example, both a1 and a2 are "significantly" different from
zero in the sense that it is highly improbable that they reflect sampling variation from
an a 1 or ¾ equal to zero. On the other hand, a 3 has a value less than twice its standard error and there is more than a 5% chance that it comes from an a 3
0.
Finally, the coefficient of determination R2 shows how much of the variation in
Y is accounted for by the estimated relationship with X 1, X 2 and X 3 • In our example
61 % is accounted for. The "unexplained" ll9% is presumably due to chance, to errors
in measurement, and most important to the potentially enormous list of other variables that also influence Y. All of these are embodied in the e ("epsilon" or "error')
term in the hypothesized relationship.

=

=

=

27. For example, interest rate was eliminated as an important variable. Although
the regression coefficient of the interest rate variable was significantly different from
zero, even if this variable could vary over its complete range, holding other variables
constant, its estimated effect would only account for a change of 2% in the proportion
of loans that are nonlocal. The potential contribution of the interest rate is even
less than this because of its high degree of correlation with loan and borrower sizes
and other variables. For given values of the other variables its variation would be
restricted and its independent variation would account for a considerably smaller
change in the proportion of nonlocal loans.
28. This was true, for example, of the effect of secured as contrasted with nonsecured loans, where the effect was limited to one type of loan, See note 32 infra and
accompanying text.
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The relatively small list of six variables of demonstrated significance in explaining variation in the location characteristic of
the loan produced the 200-page cross-classification mentioned above.
It was designed to reveal the nature of the relationships in a way
that was amenable to understanding by the lawyers and to presentation to a court. These six important variables were loan size,
borrower size, participation status of the loan, secured status of the
loan, size of the borrower's city, and the nature of the branch banking laws in the borrower's state.
VII.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SIGNIFICANT VARIABLES

The identification of "significant" variables is a matter of applying well-known and professionally accepted statistical techniques.
This aspect of the total experimental process is dependent upon
sophisticated mathematical analysis as well as upon the use of computers. Although the lawyer is likely to be left far behind the experts in this area, his expertise and understanding of the realities
of the case are essential when it comes to the interpretation of the
significant characteristics.
Thus far, our study had revealed only the significant differences
between local and nonlocal loans. Our real interest lay in the identification of locally limited as opposed to non-locally limited loans.
The local loan category included some wholesale customers who
could have borrowed nonlocally had they wished. We needed to
distinguish between variables causally related to the necessity of
borrowing locally and variables that reflected mere convenience in
banking locally. Since we wished ultimately to develop a standard
of local limitation for application to the Chicago metropolitan area,
we were interested only in factors that could be operative there in
identifying wholesale and retail bank customers. With these goals
in mind, we settled to the task of deciding why the significant variables were significant.29
A. Loan Size

As table I indicates, the percentage of loans made locally shows
a clear and steady decline as the size of loan increases. Nonlocal
loans, in other words, tend typically to be larger than local loans.
It is not hard to find causal factors that link loan size to local lim29. All of the following statements about the "facts" are based upon the full multivariate analysis. They are, in other words, the net of the effect of the other variables included in the analysis.
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itation. The larger the loan, the more attractive it becomes to
bankers. Moreover, a large loan justifies the bank expenditures required to establish the credit position of the borrower. Widely dispersed banks are willing and able to consider such loans and to
make a good fraction of them. Conversely, the small borrower often
finds that the costs of getting information about himself to banks
in areas where he is not known makes such banks either totally
unwilling to deal with him or willing to do so only at prohibitive
interest rates. Loan size, we concluded, was a measure of ability
to borrow nonlocally.
B. Borrower Size

Table 2 demonstrates that the percentage of loans made nonlocally shows a marked tendency to increase as borrower size increases. The distinction is particularly pronounced between borrowers with assets over and under $1 million. Again, causal links
with ability to borrow nonlocally are easy to find. Large companies
tend to have well-established national credit ratings, widely dispersed business activities, standing contacts with banks in many
parts of the country, and a need for a large variety of banking services (including large deposit accounts and corporate trust department services). All of these factors make the large borrower an
attractive customer for many banks. We concluded that borrower
size was a significant indicator of whether or not a loan was locally
limited. As noted above,80 these two factors have independent significance; table 4 shows that an increase in the size of the loan or
in the size of the borrower results in an increase in the proportion
of nonlocal loans, even though the other factor is held constant. In
other words, large loans to small borrowers and small loans to large
borrowers both tend to show a greater proportion of nonlocal loans
than small loans to small borrowers.
C. Participation Status of Loan

This variable distinguishes between types of loans on the basis
of the number of banks involved: single-bank loans; "overline participation loans," in which one bank-the "originating bank"shares with another bank a loan which the originating bank does
not wish (or is not legally permitted) to make alone; and "pool
loans," in which the customer negotiates with a group of two or
more banks to meet its borrowing requirements. The statistical
30. See page 1655 supra.
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analysis showed that almost 90 per cent of all single-bank loans
were local in character, while only 45 per cent of all pool loans
were local. Overline loans, like single-bank loans, were predominantly local when viewed as loans of the originating bank (85 per
cent local), but for the nonoriginating bank were even less localized
than pool loans (only 37 per cent local).
A pool loan by definition is one in which a borrower chooses to
deal with a group of two or more banks. A borrower with sufficient
sophistication to undertake this sort of arrangement will tend to
exploit the competitive advantages of negotiating with a large number of banks, some of which are likely to be outside of his local
area; hence the large proportion of nonlocal pool loans. We were
prepared to regard the difference between pool loans and single
bank loans as reflective of ability to borrow nonlocally.81
Overline loans presented a different problem. Ordinarily, in an
overline loan only the originating bank deals with the borrower;
the other bank participates in the loan at the request of the originating bank. The borrower may not even be aware that the second
bank is involved. The economists initially suggested that overline
loans be divided into two groups; those loans made by the originating bank would be lumped with single bank loans, those loans
made by the nonoriginating bank would be considered with pool
loans. On the basis of the statistical findings, this classification seemed
reasonable since the two types of overline loans appeared to share
the statistical characteristics of the single bank and pool loans, respectively. Upon consideration of the banking realities of the situation, however, we realized that this solution was erroneous. Since
our analysis was focusing on the borrower's behavior in relation to
his bank or banks, it was irrelevant that banks chose to place overlines with nonlocal banks. Thus, the low level of local loans in the
category "overlines originating at another bank" revealed nothing
about customer-bank relationships. The customer's ability to deal
with banks in various localities could be measured only by looking
at the bank with which he dealt-the originating bank. Hence, for
the purpose of identifying local limitation, only the experience of
the originating bank was significant.
D. Secured Status
In this case our hunches were not confirmed by the figures. We
had been reasonably sure before the data were processed that
31. Again this effect is in addition to the effect of other variables such as loan size
or borrower size.
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whether or not a loan was secured would prove to be significant. We
suspected that secured loans would tend to be less local than unse~
cured loans because collateral would make a borrower more attrac~
tive to distant lenders. We were quite wrong. There was a significant
relationship, but it was complex. For overline participation and pool
loans, the existence of collateral had no significant effect. For singlebank loans, the cross-classification showed that both where the borrower was small (assets under $1 million) and where the loan was
small (under $25,000) secured loans were significantly more local
than unsecured loans. A partial explanation of this finding may be
that if a relatively small business borrower needs collateral to obtain
a loan, this suggests a weakness in his credit rating which frightens
off nonlocal banks. If this is so, "secured status" is serving as a proxy
for a variable not included in the analysis: "credit rating." Assuming
that this was the case, we concluded that in the case of single-bank
loans the presence or absence of collateral would have to be taken
into account in determining local limitation.82

E. Size of Borrower's City
Table 5 reveals that, in addition to the other significant variables,
the larger the borrower's city, the smaller the percentage of loans

TABLE 5
Size of the Borrower's City and Loan Location
Size of Borrower's City
(population)
Cities of 8 million and over
Cities of 2 million to 8 million
Cities of less than 2 million
Unclassified Cities and other areas
All City Sizes

Percentage of Loans
Made Locally
97.0%
96.3
93.6
84.1
88.7

made nonlocally. All other things being equal, a borrower in New
York is more likely to borrow at home than a borrower in Philadelphia or Kalamazoo. At first glance this may seem surprising; one
might expect the New York borrower to be more sophisticated financially, and one would hardly expect his credit with nonlocal banks
to be adversely affected by the size of his city.
32. Use of a variable for only part of the data may sound peculiar, but it is not.
Perhaps an illustration from far afield will help to clarify the problem. Studies of
labor force participation show that age and sex are highly important variables in
explaining whether or not a person is in the labor force. The number and age of the
individual's children is very important for women, but of no importance for men,
for obvious reasons. A careful analysis of the problem will include this variable fot
women, but not for men.
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In fact, we concluded that this factor does not reflect inability
to borrow nonlocally, but rather indicates less need to do so. We
reasoned that non-locally limited customers would borrow locally
only if local banks had adequate resources. Accordingly, other things
being equal, borrowers in large cities would be more likely than
those in small cities to deal with local banks simply because the
banking resources of a large city are greater than those of a smaller
city. In interpreting the data in order to identify ability to borrow
nonlocally, the city-size relationship complicates rather than simplifies. It emphasizes that some local loans are indeed made to nonlocally limited borrowers. This factor had to be accommodated in
our subsequent analysis.
F. Branch Banking Situation at Borrower's Location
Borrowers in states where the banking laws permit operation of
branch banks tend to secure a significantly larger percentage of
their loans within their local area than do borrowers in unit-banking
jurisdictions which permit a bank to have only one business office.33
The explanation of this finding also appears to reflect available
banking resources and not local limitation. In general, the resources
of the banking system are more widely available to borrowers in
branch banking states than in unit-banking states. The widespread
branches of a large bank can readily draw on the resources of the
home office. The Bank of America-although headquartered in San
Francisco-is in the same community as the borrower in Sacramento;
but the First National Bank of Chicago is a nonlocal bank to the
borrower in Peoria.
G. Summary

We concluded that four of the six independent variables significantly related to loan location would be directly useful in developing
a standard of local limitation: loan size, borrower size, participation
status of loan, and secured status of loan. We felt that the remaining
two variables, borrower's city size and borrower location in a branch33. The one-variable classification on the basis of branch as compared to unitbanking stateiJ (similar to tables 1, 2, 3 and 5) showed only a small difference in the
percentage of local loans when number of loans was taken as a measure (customers in
branch banking states: 89.9% local loans; customers in unit-banking states: 85.4%
local loans). The difference was more marked when dollar amounts rather than number of loans was considered (branching: 69.5%; unit: 51.9%), Furthermore, this pattern persisted through the multivariate tables, justifying its inclusion as a significant
variable.
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or unit-banking state, did not reflect the ability of a borrower to
borrow outside his own locality but rather indicated his need to do
so.

VIII. DEVELOPMENT OF THE STANDARD OF LOCAL LIMITATION
The problem remaining was to distinguish between the local
"retail" customer and the local "wholesale" customer who presumably could borrow nonlocally. The economists suggested that those
local borrowers who shared the distinguishing characteristics of the
nonlocal borrower be classified as non-locally limited. For example,
since nonlocal loans tended to predominate among very large loans,
we would treat very large local loans as not locally limited. Since
nonlocal loans tended to predominate among loans to very large borrowers, we would treat local loans to very large borrowers as not
locally limited. We would attempt to define and adopt a quantitative
standard for drawing a line between locally limited and non-locally
limited customers based upon the constellation of characteristics
that were associated with those borrowers who had demonstrated by
their actual loan behavior that they were not locally limited.
The economists designed the second stage of the analysis to build
upon the foundations laid by the first. The prior steps had included
all of the loans in the 1955 loan survey in order to have the widest
possible range of data from which to determine the basic patterns.
For the second stage, we restricted the sample to loans made to borrowers in unit-banking states, since we had concluded that the loan
location characteristic with respect to borrowers in branch banking
states was influenced by the reduced need of such borrowers to look
elsewhere for loans and since the Continental Bank case required
us to define the locally limited market in Illinois, a unit-banking
state. On the other hand, it was impossible to make a similar allowance for the effect of the size of the borrower's city without unduly
restricting the body of experimental data; Chicago was alone in its
population size class (two to eight million) in unit-banking states.
The next step was to divide the loans to borrowers in unit-banking states into five categories corresponding to their participation
and secured status. Separate consideration was to be given to (1)
single-bank secured loans, (2) single-bank unsecured loans, (3) overline loans (originating bank), (4) overline loans (nonoriginating
bank), and (5) pool loans. For each of these five types of loan we set
up a table classifying transactions by loan size and borrower size.
Each such table constitutes a part of the cross-classification on the
four variables (loan size, borrower size, participation status, secured
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status) we had identified as both relevant for distinguishing local
from nonlocal loans and reflective of ability to borrow nonlocally.
One of these five tables is table 6. Each cell in table 6 contains
information about single-bank unsecured loans of a specified size
to borrowers of a specified size. The number in the cell shows the
percentage of all such loans which were made to local borrowers.
As expected, this table shows in almost every row and column a
decreasing proportion of local loans as loan size and borrower size
increase.34 In general, local loans predominate in the upper left
hand part of the table and nonlocal loans predominate in the lower
right hand part. Our problem was to find a boundary-running
approximately from lower left to upper right-that divided the
table into locally limited and non-locally limited characteristics.
In deciding where to draw this boundary line, we began with
the proposition that the higher the percentage of nonlocal loans in
any cell, the greater the likelihood that other borrowers of the same
size borrowing the same amount would be able to borrow nonlocally.
The question then was how large a percentage of loans in a specific cell must be made nonlocally to permit the inference that all
other loans with the same characteristics might also have been made
nonlocally. Nothing in our statistics to this point answered this
question. Clearly, as long as any wholesale customers chose to deal
with local banks in whole or in part, some non-locally limited loans
would be local loans.
After further consideration, we were led to an estimated boundary figure of 25 per cent nonlocal loans as the level which would
entitle us to classify all loans in a cell as non-locally limited loans.
Looking at table 6, this means that cells with a local loan percentage
of 75 per cent or more were considered as locally limited. In our
selection of this standard, great emphasis was given to two considerations which may cause non-locally limited loans to appear as local
loans in the table. The first of these factors we have met before:
many borrowers who are not locally limited will conduct much of
their borrowing activity locally simply because loan banks have sufficient resources for the borrowers' needs and offer loans on competitive terms. This is particularly true of large city borrowers, who
are included in this table and play an important part in the over-all
sample. The second consideration arises from the fact that the data
34. The patterns are not as completely systematic as those shown in table 4 because, as a result of breaking down the data into such detail, the number of trans•
actions reflected in many cells is relatively small, and hence the fluctuations due to
chance and individual circumstances are greater.
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in the 1955 business loan survey concern individual loan transactions, not individual customers. The significance of this is easily
demonstrated. Suppose one borrower had three outstanding loans of
equal size, two from banks in his own city and one from a distant
bank. He has demonstrated by his behavior that he is not locally
limited. But in the survey his activities would be recorded as three
separate loans, all in the same cell, with a "local percentage" of 67,
even though he is demonstrably able to borrow nonlocally.
There is yet another consideration which suggests that the 25
per cent nonlocal loan standard was a reasonable and conservative
one. The 1955 survey showed that only 11 per cent of all loans were
made nonlocally. The standard we had adopted, therefore, required
an incidence of nonlocal loans over twice as high as that which
would be expected in an "average" selection of loans. There was,
of course, nothing sacred about the 25 per cent standard; we might
have used 20 per cent or 30 per cent instead.3 1! But our judgment,
based on the banking data and what we knew about banking practices, told us that the correct percentage lay somewhere within that
range. Subsequently we utilized a completely different set of data
to validate this approximation.
With this decision made, drawing the boundary shown by the
solid line on table 6 was a routine matter.36 A similar boundary was
drawn on the tabulations for single-bank secured loans, for overline
loans by originating banks, and for pool loans. Of course, the location of the boundary line differed in each case, and the fraction of
loans classified as locally limited changed because of the effect of
secured status and loan type on local limitation. Overline loans by
nonoriginating banks, which were predominately nonlocal in character, were classified according to the boundary developed for over35. For the reader bothered by the use of a standard based on a minority of the
transactions in a given cell, an example chosen from a quite different area might be
helpful. Suppose one wanted to estimate the ages at which women usually bear children. Suppose further that the available data to answer this question consisted of a
large sample of women giving the age of each and whether she had a child during the
previous year. Since in a large group of women only a small percentage have children
in any year, any age group in which a higher than average number of women had
children during the year would be an obvious candidate for inclusion in the usual
child-bearing age group. Yet the second percentage figure might still be far less than
50%. On the other hand, if the data covered only women who actually bore children
in a given year, and the ages of these women, an entirely different statistical test would
be used, based on the distribution of child-bearing ages. Similarly, in our case, the
base statistic, the percentage of nonlocal loans in the group of all loans, was very low
and hence the minority of cases which we used in our standard was quite reasonable,
since the standard was substantially above the average for nonlocal loans.
36. Largely but not wholly routine because it was necessary to pay attention to the
number of loans in any cell and the problem of sampling variability where the number of loans was small.
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line loans made by originating banks. As discussed above, we had
concluded that for overline loans the borrower's relationship with
the originating bank was controlling.37 These tables revealed the
same general pattern shown in table 6. They defined, tabularly, a
criterion for classifying loans as locally limited or non-locally limited.
The line we drew between locally limited and non-locally limited
loans was to some extent arbitrary, although not capricious. But as
an arbitrary line it had everything to recommend it over Judge MacMahon's inspired but unsupported hunch in the Manufacturers Hanover case.38 Our standard rested on a solid foundation of empirical
investigation and analysis. Moreover, though our statistical study did
not determine precisely where the line should be drawn, it did establish that some line should be drawn. That is, the systematic correlation between the independent variables and the location characteristic were persuasive that there were in fact two different banking
markets, each with identifiable characteristics. As a result, our standard of local limitation, far more complex than Judge MacMahon's,
is also far more difficult for a court to ignore. While no standard
can be totally objective, it was possible in our procedure to identify
the specific points in the analysis at which judgment was exercised.
If a judge once starts down the path marked out by our analysis, he
can avoid its thrust only by the independent exercise of his judgment
in drawing the line at some different place.
IX.

VALIDATION OF THE CRITERIA OF LOCAL LIMITATION

Because judgment did play a role, and because a good lawyer
does not take unnecessary chances, we sought some independent ways
to validate the analysis.39 Our principal attempt to validate the proposed standard was by a further study. The value of the 1955 business loan survey lay in its extraordinarily wide scope and in the
fact that it included many important loan characteristics. However,
it could reveal only where loans were in fact made, not where they
might have been made. To measure local limitation directly re!7. See page 1662 supra.
!8. See pages 1645-46.
!9. One such validation was to show that the standard was a very conservative one
in terms of the number of borrowers classified as non-locally limited. The class of
locally limited loans according to our standard included 93.8% of all of loans to
borrowers in unit-banking states; less than 7% were placed in the "wholesale,'' nonlocally limited market. A similar pattern was observed when we looked at the general
structure of the economy. Using Internal Revenue Service data classifying active
corporations by asset size, we found that in 1961-1962 only 1.6% had assets of over $5
million and only 5,7% had asests of over $1 million. In large part, the non-locally
limited borrowers were in the over $1 million class size.
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quired more information than the 1955 loan survey could provide.
However, we could and did study in more detail a random selection
of a group of customers of the two banks involved in the merger.
This enabled us to remedy the defect in the 1955 survey, which surveyed loan transactions rather than customers. Looking directly at
bank customers, we were able to determine the geographic extent of
the customer's own business operations, his affiliations with larger
business organizations, and the extent of his banking connections.
The customer with extensive connections or with dispersed plants
or offices might be directly classified as not locally limited. On the
basis of this survey an alternative classification of the customers was
made. In about 80 per cent of the cases, the results of the two
classifications were the same, and in the remaining 20 per cent
the discrepancies went both ways--some customers whom our statistically derived standard had classified as locally limited were classified as not locally limited by the customer survey; in some cases the
reverse was true. This was, the lawyers were assured, a good record
of prediction of individual cases by a technique designed to predict
aggregate or average behavior.40
X.

APPLICATION OF THE STANDARD OF LOCAL LIMITATION TO THE
CHICAGO METROPOLITAN AREA BANKING MARKET

Now we were close to the payoff. The branch of our analysis we
have described had developed a reasonable and, we believed, wholly
defensible standard of local limitation. A second major branch had
attempted to establish that the relevant area of the "retail market"
was the entire Chicago Metropolitan Area and not any smaller subdivision thereof. This hypothesis also rested upon a quantitative
analysis of the location of the Continental Bank's retail customers
and of the customers served by other banks throughout the area
40. There are a number of subtle and sophisticated statistical issues involved here
which we need not go into in this Article. Let us merely mention a few reasons why
an individual account might be an exception to an average relationship. A customer
who, statistically, had all the earmarks of a locally limited customer might prove to
have dispersed banking connections because his father was a well-known tycoon, or because he had moved recently from another large city. A very large customer who statistically would appear as not locally limited might in fact be limited because the kind
of business he conducted was specialized in by local banks, or because he had had
some recent shaky financial experiences that local (but not distant) banks were in a position to condone. The vast list of unmeasured influences on human behavior makes 100%
prediction of individual behavior impossible. but does not prevent accurate prediction
of group behavior. Life insurance is the classic example. While never venturing to
predict when an individual will die, insurance companies predict accurately how
many of a class will die each year.
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which was based on a stratified random sample of seven banks in the
area. 41
The final step in analyzing the 1955 loan survey data was to apply
the standard of local limitation to the Chicago area business loan
market by computing market shares for Continental and City National, as well as for a group of other large banks.42 While we now
had what the lawyers believed to be the correct concept of the locally limited market, 43 it seemed advantageous for courtroom presentation to present three different sets of market-share computations
for 1955.
First, we wanted a set of market shares based solely on the total
loans of all Chicago area banks to all of their business customers
within and without the area. This is the approach to bank market
shares taken by the Government in attacking bank mergers. It is
quite simple and thoroughly misleading.
Market shares based on loans to all Chicago area borrowers by
all banks within the Chicago area and outside it were also required.
These computations do not depend on the concept of local limitation; they simply include all borrowers with Chicago area addresses
in the Chicago market. To move from raw concentration ratios to
these figures, it is necessary to eliminate loans by Chicago area banks
to non-Chicago customers and add loans to Chicago customers by
banks elsewhere. These figures are an improvement over the Government's since loans made to customers outside the Chicago area must
certainly be irrelevant to competition and concentration in the local
Chicago market. The trouble is that these figures include all the
loans to those Chicago wholesale customers who could borrow anywhere they wished.
Finally, we wanted to present a computation of market shares
and concentration ratios based on loans to customers locally limited
to the Chicago area. These concentration ratios involve the use of
the standard of local limitation which our analysis had developed.
The following tables show the results of the computations.
41. &e note 22 supra. Our survey covered the loans of a number of smaller banks
in the Chicago area which were primarily in the retail banking business, as well as the
two larger banks involved in the merger. On the basis of these surveys, we were
prepared to argue, therefore, that the entire area was a web of interlocking markets
with no rational dividing lines smaller than the area as a whole.
42. We were fortunately able to correct one of the deficiencies in the 1955 survey,
the absence of data covering loans of banks which were not members of the Federal
Reserve System. The Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago had, in 1955, conducted a
parallel survey of all banks in the Federal Reserve District, member and nonmember,
and the bank made these data available to us.
4S. The economists never wavered in criticizing the lawyers' exclusion of nonbank
competition. See pages 1651-52 supra.
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TABLE 7
Market Shares and Concentration Ratios Based Upon
Number of Loans-1955
All Loans
by CMA•
Banks
Continental Bank
City National Bank
Continental Bank, After Merger
Four Largest CMA• Banks
Four Largest CMA• Banks, After Merger

6.3%
1.9
8.2
19.0
20.9

All Loans
toCMA
Borrowers

4,0%
1.4

5.4
12.7
14.1

All Loans
toCMA
Locally
Limited
Borrowers
!l.3%
!l.!1

4.5
9.7
10.9

• Chicago metropolitan area.

TABLE 8
Market Shares and Concentration Ratios Based Upon
Dollar Volume of Loans-1955

Continental Bank
City National Bank
Continental Bank, After Merger
Four Largest CMA Banks
Four Largest CMA Banks, After Merger

All Loans
by CMA•
Banks

All Loans
toCMA
Borrowers

24.4%
2.7
27.1
82.0
84.7

11.1%

2.5
1!1.6
42.2
44.7

All Loans
toCMA
Locally
Limited
Borrowers

6.5%
2.9
9.4
28.7
!11.6

• Chicago metropolitan area.

The reduction in market shares and concentration ratios by
virtue of what we believe to be proper market definition was dramatic; in view of prevailing economic and legal standards, a court
might well accept it as a difference in kind instead of degree.44 If
the Government should choose number of loans as the relevant
measure, market shares (which are in any case relatively low) are cut
almost in half. If, as was more likely, the Government's focus was
on dollar volume, the market share of the merged bank would drop
from 27.1 per cent to 9.4 per cent and the four-bank market share
would drop from 84.7 per cent to 31.6 per cent.45 Notice, inciden44. It is important to note that there is nothing in our procedure which inherently
reduces market shares and concentration ratios. In any market some banks will have
more than an average share of locally limited business and some less. Only for the
former does reduction operate. For example, in table 8, City National Bank's market
share is increased under our procedure.
45. The results of our analysis were less favorable to the Continental Bank than
the application of the $100,000 standard adopted by Judge MacMahon in the Manu•
facturers-Hanover case. Using the latter standard, Continental's post-merger share of
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tally, that the simple identification of borrowers' location (as shown
in the middle columns of tables 7 and 8, which neglect our criteria
of local limitation) cut dollar volume market shares in half. We had
every reason to believe that if a similar analysis were possible in
1961, when the merger took place, an equally impressive reduction
would have appeared.46
These large quantitative reductions in concentration ratios have
a profound qualitative significance. An industry in which the four
largest firms control more than 80 per cent of the dollar volume of
business is likely to be dominated by these firms; on the other hand,
an industry in which the four largest firms control only 30 per cent
of the dollar volume necessarily has a large number of sellers. In
the latter situation, rivalry among firms is likely to be intense and
buyers will have a wide choice of alternatives.
The utility of our analysis of local limitation did not end with
the reduction of the merged bank's market share to below 10 per
cent and the lowering of the four-bank concentration ratio to slightly
over 30 per cent. The analysis also revealed that the character of
the local banking market was not at all what surface appearances suggested.
Using the 1955 figures, for example, Chicago area banks made
about 23,000 business loans totaling $2.4 billion. The average loan
balance was over $100,000. While only 3,000 of these loans were to
borrowers located outside the Chicago area, these nonlocal loans
accounted for fully one half ($1.2 billion) of the dollar balances.
Another 1,500 loans by Chicago banks to Chicago-located borrowers
were excluded from the local market by the application of the standard of local limitation. The remaining locally limited loans involved only $307 million of loan balances. The average size of these
locally limited loans was less than $20,000. Thus, although the elimination of non-locally limited loans resulted in only a small reduction
in the number of loans, it achieved a dramatic reduction in the overthe number of loans would be 4.2%, of dollar amounts, 7.3%. This loss of advantage
was more than compensated for, in our view, by the gain in our confidence in the
ability to defend our standard.
46. There were a number of techniques we used to justify using the 1955 data
for a case which arose in 1961. One was the special survey of customers of the merged
banks, in which we chose 1961 customers as the subject of the study. See note 40
supra and accompanying text. Another way to show that the structural features of
banking markets had not changed significantly in the intervening years. Thus, we
showed that the size distribution of business entities had not significantly altered over
the period and that the loan portfolios of large banks showed a stable size distribution
of loans. Each of these demonstrations required special statistical studies on the use
of existing studies.
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all dollar volume of the local business loan market and the average
loan size in that market.
The significance of this finding can be fully appreciated only in
the light of the broader economic argument made on behalf of Continental. The substance of that argument was that the Chicago area
banking market had been characterized by the entry and successful
growth of many new banks in the two decades preceding the merger.
Our finding that the true local-or "retail"-business loan market
was small in both over-all size and size of individual transactions
meshed perfectly with the growth of the number of bank competitors
in the market. If the average local market loan is approximately
$20,000, it is clear that even the smallest bank could make such
loans. Therefore, the large downtown banks with their immense
resources have no preclusive competitive advantages in this local,
retail market.
XI.

PRESENTATION OF THE RESULTS

Of course, even if all of this reads well in a law review, the important question is whether courts can be persuaded to accept such
a statistical analysis. This question in fact breaks down into two
quite different ones: the question of admissibility and that of intelligibility.
The problem of admissibility need not detain us. La'\'ryers and
judges in the "big case" have certainly accustomed themselves to
processing vast quantities of statistical material. Quantitative analysis would not significantly add to this task. Indeed, if the legal
profession seriously absorbed modern sampling and other statistical
techniques, the gathering of data for a complicated economic case
would be simplified. If opposing lawyers can satisfy themselves and
the court as to the validity of the parties' data selection and processing, there should be no difficulty in getting the information revealed by the data into the record.
The question of intelligibility is a more formidable one. Obviously, if we had presented our 200-page computer printout crossclassification of the six relevant variables to the court in the Continental Bank case, we would have done the court and our case a
disservice. Quantitative analysis is a powerful tool, but we did not
expect the court to try to trace every step we had taken.
Indeed, the lawyers' basic courtroom strategy was not to start
with quantitative analysis at all. We were prepared to produce a
series of ordinary witnesses, bankers and bank customers, who would
testify about their own banking experiences. The court would
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thereby be introduced to the "locally limited" and "non.locally limited" customer in the flesh. Banks would describe the loans they
actually made to customers in their locality and to those located elsewhere. In this manner we would present "retail" and "wholesale"
banking in qualitative rather than quantitative terms.
We planned to hold back our quantitative analysis until the court
understood our theory of the case and its key terminology. The presentation of the analysis would then be the task of the economist,
testifying as an expert witness. We expected him to describe the
process of data collection and statistical manipulation. This testimony would cover the scope and objectivity of the underlying data,
as well as the statistical techniques and computer processing we had
used in preparing the data for analysis. Finally, the economist would
explain the reasoning process presented in this Article, using our
tables and charts for illustration and clarification. It would then be
open to opposing counsel to demonstrate analytic errors and alternative explanatory hypotheses.

XII. A

SUMl\fARY AND A PROSPECT

Our case study has described the essential features of quantitative multivariate analysis as applied to a legal problem. The goal
of quantitative analysis is to discover and present an ordered analysis of a complex factual situation. It is the counterpart in the social
sciences of the controlled experiment in the natural sciences. As
noted above, it is an essential characteristic of quantitative analysis
that it lays bare the analytic process and does not leave vital questions to "intuitive" resolution. In this way it should be possible to
deepen the fact-finding process which is at the heart of every trial.
The essence of the process is the identification and evaluation
of the various factors which influence social phenomena. Using quantitative analysis, the social scientist can reach insights about which
factors cause a given result and which do not. To do so, he uses
data collected from the workings of society as it exists. Although
no two events are similar in all respects, the social scientist can
determine significant factors by observing the patterns which emerge
from a large number of events. For the lawyer, therefore, quantitative analysis will be of use where a question of causation can best
be answered by indirect evidence. In our case, we developed objective standards to identify bank borrowers who were locally limited
by discovering the factors which caused loans to be made locally
rather than nonlocally.
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Other examples of questions which might be approached in this
manner come readily to mind. In an elegant exercise in the application of statistical theory to a legal problem, Michael 0. Finkelstein
has demonstrated that a quantitative test can be used to prove
whether or not discriminatory techniques were used in the selection
of juries.47 Alfred F. Conard has shown how quantitative analyses
of automobile personal injury litigations wholly changes the lawyer's
view of the nature of the problem.48 Quantitative techniques could
be used, for example, to determine whether a particular type of
automobile was properly designed; the examination of a large
enough sample of accidents involving various types of automobiles
may reveal whether or not a particular type is more accident-prone
than others. If such a pattern did exist, and if other factors were
investigated and rejected as the cause of the pattern, this would
show that it is the particular type of automobile that is at fault. If
no such pattern emerged, the opposite would seem to be proved,
that is, that the particular automobile design was no worse than
others.
The necessity of accumulating a large body of experimental data
makes quantitative analysis an expensive game. So does the use of
sophisticated computers, not to mention the cost of sophisticated experts. Clients may boggle at the cost of preparing a "big case," but
they are usually so concerned with winning it that they will sign the
· necessary checks.
Quantitative analysis is not merely a mechanical or statistical
process, although a statistical technique and the manipulation of
large bodies of data are among its necessary elements. The exercise
of intelligence in the formulation of the problem and in the interpretation of the statistical results is also necessary. It is in these areas
that the lawyer must contribute to the analysis. His understanding
of the legal context of the problem and of the nuances of the factual
situation must be brought to bear if the results are to be useful.
Our principal concern thus far has been the use of quantitative
analysis in the resolution of complicated factual questions, concentrating on its use in litigation of the "big case." For the practicing
lawyer, this is likely to be its most important immediate application. However, the legal profession is concerned in the long run
with improving the law as well as applying it. Quantitative analysis
47. Finkelstein, The Application of Statistical Decision Theory to the Jury Discrimination Cases, 80 HARV. L. REv. 3!!8 (1966).
48. Conard, The Quantitative Analysis of Justice, 20 J. LEGAL ED. I (1967).
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has an imporant role to play in this process: it can assist in evaluating the effects, and the effectiveness, of our legal system.
For example, it is obvious that the antitrust laws are based at
least in part on economic theories which assume that certain types
of market structures or behavioral rules will yield desirable economic
performance in the real world. The antitrust laws are presumably
designed to foster a competitive system and thus to achieve an efficient use of resources. In the Continental Bank case, quantitative
analysis was used to describe, we believe with considerable sophistication, the structure of banking markets in the American economy.
However, economists have already begun to use these techniques to
investigate the more fundamental question of the relationship between particular kinds of market structures and the performance of
markets.49 This research has, thus far, been largely inconclusive. Attempts have been made, for example, to relate bank concentration
ratios in various cities to the level of interest rates paid on savings
deposits or charged on bank loans in such cities. Thus far the
economists have been content to measure concentration ratios by
the raw balance sheet figures which our studies in the Continental
Bank case show to be potentially misleading. Hopefully, some of
this research will be repeated using the insights gained from our
work.
In time, if such quantitative research into the operation of
economic markets is refined and expanded, it may be possible to
develop rules of market behavior and standards of market structure
which will in fact lead to important improvements in economic performance. Furthermore, the very process of achieving such knowledge would necessarily entail a refinement of concepts such as "market," "concentration," or "trend." Hopefully, these refinements
could be administered with some objectivity and an even hand;
at present, we suffer an almost random application of confusingeven though often overly precise-standards.
This is only one example of a part of our legal structure which
could be refined by the use of quantitative analysis. There are many
others. In many areas, the research lawyer or the law professor will
want to enlist the cooperation of other social scientists-the economist, the sociologist, and the political scientist-as well as that of
~9. See, e.g., Edwards, The Banking Competition Controversy, !$ NAT'L BANKING
REv. 1 (1965); Edwards, Concentration in Banking and Its Effect on Business Loan
Rates, 46 REv. OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS 294 (1964); Flechsig, The Effect of Concentration on Bank Loan Rates, 20 J. OF FINANCE 298 (1965).
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the statistical analyst. However, the lawyer, if he makes the effort
necessary to understand the techniques, will find that he can bring
his own special legal insights to bear on the solution of these problems.

